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Abstract. In management, incentives are a reward to motivate people and create favorable 
conditions directed to achieve specific goals and support organizational development. This 
conceptual paper analyses differences between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives to suggest 
management implications directed to support motivation and performance of employees in 
public organizations.  
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1. Introduction  
he concept of incentive in management and economics is developed 
from behavioral research in psychology to analyze and explain what 
motivates people in organizations and/or in competition (Mullins, 
1999). In general, the concept of incentive is associated with motivation, 
which indicates the forces that energize, direct and sustain behavior (Perry 
& Porter, 1982). Management uses systems of incentive to motivate 
employees to work, to achieve strategic goals, to improve organizational 
and managerial behavior of firms in markets (Armstrong, 2007; Brockner & 
Vasta, 1981; O'Reilly & Caldwell, 1980; Prendergast, 2008; Pritchard et al., 
1977; Reif, 1975). Incentives can be categorized as: intrinsic and extrinsic 
incentives that have different characteristics and generate different 
organizational effects (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. Characteristics and effects of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives 
 
 
2. Intrinsic versus extrinsic incentives 
Intrinsic incentives exist in the job itself and give personal satisfaction to 
individuals, such as autonomy, reputation, trust, empowerment, expense 
preference (e.g., leeway to invest monetary resources), etc. O’Reilly et al., 
(1991) have suggested that intrinsic incentives may be important for 
affective commitment, job involvement and motivation in organizations to 
support satisfaction of employees. Intrinsic incentives can satisfy personal 
needs directly by creating an intrinsic reward for those who perform the 
tasks (Frey & Jegen, 2001; George, 1992). Moreover, intrinsic incentives tend 
to emphasize pleasure and enjoyment. Wright (2007, p.60) using goal 
theory argues that: ‚the intrinsic rewards provided by the nature or 
function of the organization may be more important to public sector 
employees than …performance-related extrinsic rewards‛. Hence, public 
organizations perceive better organizational support and satisfaction from 
intrinsic incentives that generate positive contributions to both job 
involvement and affective commitment (O’Driscoll & Randall, 1999). 
An example of intrinsic incentive is awards that are given to a person in 
recognition of excellence and best performance in certain fields or 
positions, increasing reputation (it is the general belief or opinion held by 
other people regarding a person’s specific characteristics or abilities in 
certain public positions)1. Intrinsic incentives can be awards associated with 
trophy, title, certificate, commemorative plaque, medal, badge, pin, or 
ribbon. Intrinsic incentives may also simply be a public acknowledgment of 
excellence, without any tangible token or prize (cf., Benati & Coccia, 2018). 
Extrinsic incentives include elements, such as pay and fringe benefits, 
gifts, promotion, advancement opportunities, etc. Extrinsic incentives are 
 
1 Coccia, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011, 2014, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2015, 
2015a, 2017, 2017a, 2018, 2018a-r, Coccia & Benati, 2018; Coccia & Bellitto, 2018; Coccia & 
Cadario, 2014; Coccia & Rolfo,  2010; Coccia et al., 2015. 
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more likely to be important in relation to continuance commitment to 
organizations (O’Reilly et al., 1991). Extrinsic incentives play a relatively 
small role in the prediction of job involvement and affective commitment 
(O’Driscoll & Randall, 1999). Some extrinsic incentives are (Benati & 
Coccia, 2018):  
Compensation can include basic categories: a) guaranteed pay – a fixed 
monetary incentive paid by organizations to employees. The most common 
form of guaranteed pay is the base salary. Guaranteed pay also includes 
cash allowances (housing allowance, transport allowance, etc.), differentials 
(shift differentials, holiday differentials) and premiums (overtime, etc.); b) 
Variable payis anon-fixed monetary incentive paid by organizations to 
employees. It is contingent on discretion, performance, and/or results 
achieved; c) Benefits are programs that organizations use to supplement 
employees’ compensation, such as paid time off, medical insurance, and 
more. 
Allowance is an amount of money given or allotted at regular intervals 
for a specific purpose. Allowances may be travel expenses, daily allowance 
(also called ‘subsistence allowance’), general expenditure allowance, 
medical costs, end-of-term allowance, etc. 
 
3. Relations between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives 
in public organizations 
Incentives have a powerful effect on performance, motivation, 
commitment and satisfaction of employees in organizations (Bowman, 
2010; O’Reilly et al., 1991). Lincoln & Kalleberg (1990) argue that incentives 
offered by organizations may have a powerful effect on employees’ 
attitudes and motivations towards their job and the company for which 
they work (cf., O’Driscoll & Randall, 1999).  
In general, the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
can generate positive, negative, or neutral relationship (Frey & Jegen, 2001; 
Staw, 1976). Relevant theories analyze whether extrinsic rewards are 
positively associated with job satisfaction (Judge et al., 2010). Scholars argue 
that pay-for-performance applied to compensate and motivate public 
officials can produce, by itself, only minimally productive performance in 
public sector (cf., Benati & Coccia, 2017). In fact, the literature of public 
administration suggests that performance-based pay incentives are only 
marginally related to public service satisfaction and motivation (cf., Benati 
& Coccia, 2018; Judge et al., 2010).  
Intrinsic motivation, under certain conditions, can be undermined by 
pay for performance (i.e., extrinsic incentives): in fact, a performance-
contingent monetary incentive to do something employees already enjoy 
can decrease their motivation to do it because the person is likely to view 
its action as externally driven rather than as internally appealing. In fact, 
extrinsic incentives can produce crowding-out effect (Frey & Oberholzer-
Gee, 1997) and thus may negatively impact performance of employees and, 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
 M. Coccia, JEB, 6(1), 2019, p.20-29. 
23 
23 
as a consequence, of organizations (Weibel et al., 2009). Frey & Jegen (2001, 
p. 592) confirm that extrinsic incentives, such as performance pay can 
crowd out intrinsic motivation to do a good job. Most scholars argue that 
crowding-out effects exist because public service motivation is associated 
with intrinsic motives and the love of money is related to extrinsic motives 
(Deci et al., 1999). 
Frey & Jegen (2001) summarized the two main premises of motivation 
crowding theory: (1) all interventions originating from rewards and 
regulations accompanied by negative sanctions may affect intrinsic 
motivation, and (2) external interventions may crowd out or crowd in 
intrinsic motivation (or leave it unaffected).  
Self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985) suggests that extrinsic 
rewards are demotivating and dissatisfying to individuals. In fact, extrinsic 
motivations can undermine perceived autonomy because they have a 
negative effect on intrinsic interest in a task or job (Deci & Ryan, 2000). In 
general, it is possible that extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic 
motivation (Titmuss, 1970). Deci & Ryan (2004) posit that a variety of 
tangible contingent rewards undermine intrinsic motivation, but 
unexpected and task-non-contingent rewards have no effect on intrinsic 
motivation. In general, scholars claim that the explicit incentives of 
performance-related pay may crowd out intrinsic motivations (Green & 
Heywoodz, 2008). Experimental research inspired by self-determination 
theory reveals that monetary (extrinsic) incentives generate two opposite 
effects (Weibel et al., 2010): a) they enhance extrinsic motivation (the price 
effect); b) they threaten the need for autonomy, competence, and 
relatedness, lowering intrinsic motivation (the crowding-out effect). In 
short, financial incentives are likely to generate a greater crowding out of 
intrinsic motivation in public organizations2 than in private ones because 
there is more intrinsic motivation in the public sector and more of it can, 
therefore, be destroyed. Overall, with all other things equal, the crowding-
out effect can be greater among civil servants with stronger intrinsic 
motivation at the baseline (cf., Belle & Cantarelli, 2015). 
In the context of incentive management, the goal theory suggests that 
motivation and incentive can increase organizational performance. The 
premise of goal theory is that people’s goals play an important role in 
determining behavior. Goals direct work behavior, motivation and 
performance and lead to certain consequences or feedback. People with 
specific level of performance, or a given deadline for completion a task, will 
have a higher motivation to perform better than people with no set goal. 
Moreover, people having difficult goals will perform better than people 
with easier goals (Mullins, 1999). Locke (1968) pointed out that goal-setting 
is more appropriate viewed as motivational technique rather than a formal 
 
2  An example of public organization is public research institutions that produce new 
technology and knowledge in a context of national system of innovation (cf., Coccia, 
2005a, 2015b, 2016, 2017b, 2018e, 2018f).  
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theory of motivation. Overall, then, the theory of goal setting provides a 
useful approach to work motivation, incentive and performance. Goal 
theory has a variety of managerial implications: specific performance goals 
should systematically be identified and set in order to direct behavior and 
maintain motivation and motivation; goals should be set at a challenging 
but realistic level; difficult goals lead to higher motivation and 
performance; employee participation in the setting of goals may also lead 
to higher motivation to work and performance (Mullins, 1999, p.439; Miner, 
1980).  
Studies in public administration also show that extrinsic and intrinsic 
incentives can reduce corruption in public service. However, the empirical 
evidence is still mixed (Georgellis et al., 2010). Studies suggest that 
bureaucrats are led to corruption partly because their public service efforts 
on the job are not properly rewarded extrinsically or intrinsically. Kwon 
(2012) argues that PSM (public service motivation) can be an important 
intrinsic incentive for public service. Generally speaking, extrinsic 
motivation for public service (e.g., performance-based pay or promotion) or 
intrinsic motivation (e.g., public service motivation, or PSM) can channel 
bureaucrats’ time and energy into public service and consequently reduce 
corruption (cf., Tang et al., 2008; Tang & Chen, 2008; Liu & Tang, 2011). In 
short, PSM as well as other intrinsic incentives appear to be important 
deterrents to corruption. Evidence reveals that PSM increases public service 
performance (Petrovsky, 2009), and Kwon (2012) suggests that intrinsic 
incentives based on PSM can reduce corruption. Many studies have 
confirmed that extrinsic rewards can reduce (or crowd out) intrinsic 
motivation (e.g., Frey & Jegen 2001; Georgellis et al., 2010; Houston 2006; 
Ryan & Deci 2000; Titmuss 1970). However, the evidence suggests that both 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations are effective in deterring corruption. In 
particular, Kwon (2012) presents empirical evidence that promoting 
intrinsic motivation with appropriate incentives can be effective in 
deterring corruption, possibly more than extrinsic motivation (such as 
performance pay). In brief, PSM can be an anti-corruption best practice for 
public organizations. Finally, Kwon (2012) also suggests that although 
discretion (or delegation of authority) generally increases corruption, but 
when performance pay is strong, the bureaucrats use their discretion to 
increase their public service performance rather than to pursue corruption.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Overall, then, the domain of incentive systems can generate a variety of 
effects in organizations. In general, the crowding-out effect suggests that 
external incentives undermine intrinsic motivation (Frey & Jegen 2001). A 
good match in public organizations between personal values (high public 
service motivation) and the nature of the task (providing services to general 
public) leads to high intrinsic motivation and likely high performance (Liu 
& Tang, 2011) and low corruption (Kwon, 2012). To conclude, the public 
sector is less dependent on financial incentives and for increasing efficiency 
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and performance of public organizations it is vital to find a balance 
between extrinsic incentives (e.g., pay) and intrinsic incentives related to 
job satisfaction and involvement of personnel (cf., Coccia, 2001; Crewson, 
1997, 504; Perry et al., 2010; Rainey, 1982). 
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